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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEVADA

In the matter of:

LANDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OAG FILE NO.: 13897-465 & 466

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BACKGROUND

The Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") received Complaints from Anthony Hall and Ashley Ramos alleging violations of the Nevada Open Meeting Law ("OML") by the Lander County School District Board of Trustees ("Board"). The Complaints allege that the Board violated the OML in its actions during and surrounding meetings occurring between October 2022 and March 2023.

The OAG has statutory enforcement powers under the OML and the authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the OML. NRS 241.037; NRS 241.039; NRS 241.040. The OAG's investigation of the Complaints included a review of the Complaints and supplemental information; the response from the Board and attachments; The agenda, minutes and recordings of the Board's October 18 and November 8, 2022, and January 17, 2023, meetings.

After investigating the Complaints, the OAG determines that the Board violated the OML by creating a subcommittee that failed to comply with the OML and by refusing to allow Complainant Ramos to attend its February 7 and March 7, 2023, meetings in person as she had requested.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On or around August 2022, the School District initiated disciplinary proceedings regarding Complainant Ramos, a District employee. At some point in the proceedings, Ms. Ramos was placed on administrative leave with a condition that she not come on District property without prior written permission.

- 2. In or around October or November 2022, a quorum of the Board held one or more private gatherings with its counsel regarding Ms. Ramos and another employee's disciplinary matters.
- 3. The Board held a public meeting on October 18, 2022. Item F.1 on the public notice agenda for the meeting read: "Approve a Subcommittee to Review Elements within the Superintendent's Contract." During the meeting, the Chair of the Board announced two other members who had volunteered to join him on the Subcommittee. The Board then voted to make those three members constitute the Subcommittee.
- 4. The Board held a public meeting on November 8, 2022. Item F.3 on the public notice agenda for the meeting read: "Superintendent Formal Evaluation." Item F.4 read: "Approval of Superintendent's Contract." During Item F.3, Board members read their performance reviews of the Superintendent, discussed these reviews and his performance, and voted to find a satisfactory evaluation of the Superintendent.
- 5. During Item F.4, the Chair announced that he was part of the Subcommittee that had reviewed the contract and they were proposing a new 4-year contract. The Board then discussed the details of the contract and voted to approve it.
- 6. The Board held a public meeting on January 17, 2023. Item I on the public notice agenda was a closed session to discuss Ms. Ramos' disciplinary matter. Item J read: "Action as a result of closed session."
- 7. During the meeting, the Board moved to go into closed session under Item I. Ms. Ramos and her counsel, Complainant Hall, were permitted to attend. After the closed session, the Board voted to follow the recommendations of the hearing officer under Item J.
- 8. On or around February 1, 2023, Ms. Ramos requested permission to come onto District property to attend the Board's February 7, 2023, meeting. She was denied permission and offered a link to attend the meeting virtually.
- 9. On or around March 3, 2023, Ms. Ramos requested permission to come onto District property to attend the Board's March 7, 2023, meeting. She was denied permission

and offered a link to attend the meeting virtually. The only reasons for the denials were that they were consistent with the Board's past practice, and it would continue "until your employee incident is finalized."

- 10. Complainants filed the instant complaints alleging:1
 - a. The Board acted outside of a meeting by revoking the Superintendent's decision-making authority over two employee disciplinary matters during a closed-door meeting.
 - b. The Board discussed and deliberated on settlement terms for two employee matters during an attorney-client session.
 - c. The Board created a Subcommittee at its October 18, 2022, meeting to review the Superintendent's contract and the Subcommittee failed to comply with the OML.
 - d. The Board violated the OML by refusing permission for Ms. Ramos to attend its February 7 and March 7, 2023, meetings upon her request.

LEGAL STANDARDS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Board, as the governing body of a public school district under NRS 386.110, is a public body as defined in NRS 241.015(4) and is subject to the OML.

A. There is insufficient evidence that any action was taken during the attorney-client sessions at issue and the Board acted on the employee matters during a public meeting.

The Nevada Legislature has excepted from the OML gatherings of public bodies at which a quorum is present "[t]o receive information from the attorney employed or retained by the public body regarding potential or existing litigation involving a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power and to deliberate

¹ Ms. Ramos' Complaints included allegations regarding attendance at meetings and records requests that fell outside the OAG's 120-day window of investigative power contained in NRS 241.039. As such, those allegations will not be addressed in this opinion.

toward a decision on the matter, or both." NRS 241.015(3)(b)(2). The OAG has previously held that this exception can apply to deliberations whether a public body would approve certain terms of a settlement agreement, so long as the final agreement is approved by the body at a public meeting. *In re Clark County School District Board of Trustees*, OMLO 13897-410 at 3-4 (Dec. 2021).

There is no dispute here that a quorum of the Board met on two occasions with its counsel regarding two employee disciplinary matters in which the employees were represented by counsel and contesting the discipline. These meetings were not recorded, nor were they required to be, and the OAG is limited in its inquiry into the meetings as they are covered by the attorney client privilege. NRS 49.095.

The Board conducted later hearings into the employee matters, at which the employees were present, and then acted regarding those matters during its January 17 public meeting. The OAG has insufficient evidence that the Board took any action to change its policy regarding the Superintendent's authority over employee matters. Indeed, had the Superintendent had the sole authority to take the employee actions that were taken by the Board, they would not have occurred during a public meeting.

B. The Board is permitted to deliberate on potential or existing litigation in an attorney-client session so long as the resulting action is taken during a public meeting.

As noted above, NRS 241.015(3)(b)(2) specifically permits a public body to confer with its counsel regarding potential settlement terms that it may accept and includes the term "deliberation" in that permission. Here, the Board clearly took its final action during its January 17 meeting. While the final action did not involve the approval of a settlement agreement, the evidence indicates that no such settlement agreement was reached. The failure of settlement negotiations does not negate a public body's ability to discuss terms it may or may not accept with its counsel during negotiations. OMLO 13897-410, *supra*. Thus, the OAG does not find a violation of the OML with respect to this allegation.

C. The Board violated the OML when its Subcommittee to Review the Superintendent's Contract failed to comply with the OML.

Subcommittees of public bodies are public bodies themselves and required to comply with the OML. NRS 241.015(4)(d). A subcommittee is a public body under the OML if it consists of at least two persons who are appointed by the public body, a majority of the membership of the subcommittee are members or staff members of the public body, or the subcommittee is authorized to make a recommendation to the public body to take any action. *Id*.

Here, at its October 18 meeting, the Board appointed three members to review elements of the Superintendent's contract by motion and vote. At the Board's November 8 meeting, a member stated he was part of the Subcommittee that reviewed the Superintendent's contract and that they were recommending a 4-year contract. After some discussion, the Board moved and voted to approve the contract.

This group meets the definition of a subcommittee in that it was appointed by the Board, contained only Board members and was authorized to make a recommendation to the Board regarding the contract. The Board does not contend that the Subcommittee was exempt from the OML and the evidence indicates that the Subcommittee did not comply with the OML when it met. Thus, the OAG finds a violation of the OML in this respect. The OAG notes that it does not possess evidence that this failure to comply with the OML was intentional, only that it was based upon a mistaken understanding of the law.

D. The Board violated the OML by refusing to grant permission to Ms. Ramos to attend its February 7 and March 7, 2023, meetings in person upon her request.

Except as otherwise provided by a specific statute, all meetings of public bodies must be open and public, and all people must be permitted to attend. NRS 241.020(1). The legislative intent of the OML is that actions of public bodies "be taken openly, and that their deliberations be conducted openly." NRS 241.010(1); see also McKay v. Board of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 651, 730 P.2d 438, 443 (1986) ("the spirit and policy behind NRS Chapter 241 favors open meetings"). All exceptions to the OML must be construed

narrowly and in favor of openness. Chanos v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 124 Nev. 232, 239, 181 P.3d 675, 680 (2008). "[T]he narrow construction of exceptions to the Open Meeting Law stems from the Legislature's use of the term 'specific' in NRS 241.020(1) and that such exceptions must be explicit and definite." Id. The OML "mandates open meetings unless 'otherwise specified by statute" McKay, 102 Nev. at 651. In this instance, Complainant Ramos was prevented from physically attending the two meetings at issue solely because of terms in her administrative leave.

In an effort to protect the public's First Amendment right to free speech, the OML prohibits public comment restrictions that are based upon viewpoint. NRS 241.020(3)(d)(7). Restricting speech based upon identity is akin to restricting based on viewpoint and equally prohibited by the First Amendment. Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) ("Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others."); Rodgers c. Stachey, 382 F. Supp. 3d 869, 881 (W.D. Ark. 2019) (speech restrictions based on identity of the speaker all too often imply a means to control content). Restrictions on attendance at public meetings necessarily affect the public's ability to make public comment, even if public comment is offered by other means. As such, neither type of restriction can be based upon viewpoint or identity. In re Pahrump Community Library District Board of Trustees, OMLO 13897-455 at 4 (Jan. 2024).

Here, Ms. Ramos desired to attend the meetings at issue in person, there was a physical location available to the public and public members were generally permitted to attend at the physical location. Public bodies may apply speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these restrictions must be based on allowing those bodies to perform their functions. *Citizens United* at 341; *Reza v. Pearce*, 806 F.3d 497, 504 (9th Cir. 2015) (restrictions on speech during public meetings are permitted to maintain decorum and order in the proceeding). However, the Board did not offer any reason for its refusal to allow Ms. Ramos to attend the meetings in person other than that the terms of her administrative leave permitted such a refusal. This was a public meeting

that Ms. Ramos was attempting to attend in her private capacity as a member of the public. Had the meeting occurred off District property, Ms. Ramos would have been able to attend without requesting permission.

The Board argues the language of NRS 241.020(1) requiring people to be able to attend any meeting "at a physical location or by means of a remote technology system" means their provision of a virtual link for Ms. Ramos to attend the meeting virtually met all statutory requirements. While the OAG agrees that virtual attendance can be equivalent to in person attendance, a public body is not permitted to decide who may attend virtually and who may attend in person without a compelling reason. Specifically targeting an attendance/speech restriction to one person without serving a governmental function, results in an impermissible identity-based restriction.

The Board further argues that it was permitted to take discipline against an employee pursuant to NRS Chapter 391, Chapter 288 and the subject collective bargaining agreement and that these specific provisions control over the OML's general open meeting provisions. The OAG does not find this persuasive. The Board does not contend that another statutory provision prevented it from permitting Complainant Ramos to attend the meeting, only that it had authority to issue the administrative leave terms and the OML cannot change that. The OAG is not opining on the validity of the administrative leave terms, but on the exercise of the District's discretion in granting or refusing permission under those terms. The administrative leave terms restricted Ms. Ramos from District property without prior written permission. Ms. Ramos requested that permission for the two meetings at issue and was denied without any reason. It is undisputed that Ms. Ramos was permitted to and did attend the Board's January 17 meeting, where there was a closed session pertaining to her. The Board offered no argument that Ms. Ramos created a disruption at the January 17 meeting and the recording of the meeting does not reveal one.

While this is a very fact specific determination, and a different record of disruption, could justify a Board's decision to prohibit physical attendance, the Board did not present any facts demonstrating that its denial of Ms. Ramos's request was serving a governmental

function, or necessary to preserve an orderly meeting. Thus, the OAG finds that the Board violated the OML by refusing to grant permission to Ms. Ramos to attend the February 7 and March 7 public meetings in person when she requested it.

SUMMARY

Upon investigating the present Complaints, the OAG makes findings of fact and conclusions of law that the Board violated the OML by creating a subcommittee that did not comply with the OML, by discussing and deliberating on the Superintendent's contract in closed session, and by arbitrarily and without cause prohibiting Ms. Ramos from physically attending a meeting.

If the Attorney General investigates a potential OML violation and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law that a public body has taken action in violation of the OML, "the public body must include an item on the next agenda posted for a meeting of the public body which acknowledges the findings of fact and conclusions of law." NRS 241.0395. The public body must treat the opinion of the Attorney General as supporting material for the agenda item(s) in question for the purpose of NRS 241.020. Id. Accordingly, the Board must place an item on its next meeting agenda in which it acknowledges the present Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Opinion") resulting from the OAG's investigation in this matter. The Board must also include the OAG Opinion in the supporting materials for its next meeting.

Dated: July 3, 2024.

AARON FORD Attorney General

/s/ Rosalie Bordelove ROSALIE BORDELOVE Chief Deputy Attorney General

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1	I hereby certify that on the 3 rd day of July, 2024, I served the foregoing FINDINGS
2	OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by depositing a copy of the same in the
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4	United States mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, CERTIFIED MAIL addressed
5	as follows:
6	
7	Anthony L. Hall
8	
9	Complainant
10	Certified Mail No.: 7020 2450 0001 1950
11	Ashley Ramos
12	
13	Complainant
14	Certified Mail No.: 7020 2450 0001 1950
15	Matt Morris
16	Holland & Hart, LLP 5441 Kietzke Lane, Suite 200
17	Reno, Nevada 89511
18	Counsel to the Lander County School District Board of Trustees
19	Certified Mail No.: 7020 0640 0000 7651 9012
20	
21	
22	/s/ Debra Turman
23	An employee of the Office of the
24	Nevada Attorney General
25	
26	
27	
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